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Abstract
This article presents a generalization of the equilibrium analysis for the simple two-player
poker game with alternate bidding of Von Neumann and Morgenstern. It approximates
optimal play for this game if it is played with a regular deck of 52 cards and it discusses
some strategic insights. In addition, the paper studies the relative skill level of this game.
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1 Introduction
An interesting aspect of a game with chance elements is the skill that players can utilize to
a®ect the game's outcome. This is obviously an interesting topic for discussion among players
or between players and spectators, but besides that it is also important from a juridical point
of view. In many countries, for instance in the Netherlands, the exploitation of casino games is
regulated by a law that makes a distinction between games of chance and games of skill. As the
name suggests, this distinction is based on the skill that can be used in the game. Games of skill
can be freely exploited, whereas for the exploitation of games of chance a licence is required.
The Dutch government has only granted such a licence to its own Holland Casino foundation.
Following the Dutch gaming act, Borm and Van der Genugten (2001) roughly de¯ned the
skill level of a game as the extent to which players can in°uence the game outcome, relative to
the e®ect of the random device on this outcome. They developed a measure which enables an
ordering of games on the real line between zero and one. A pure game of chance is assigned a
skill level of zero, while a skill level of one corresponds to pure games of skill. A paper on skill
in a somewhat broader context is Larkey, Kadane, Austin and Zamir (1997). That paper does
not consider juridical problems, but it provides an interesting discussion on the interpretation
and relevance of the concept of skill in analyzing and solving games.
A class of games that is interesting for application of the skill analysis is formed by poker
games. So far, the skill computations in this area were restricted to simple examples that were
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1used mainly for decorative purposes. Only games with very few cards were considered, while
in a real poker game a player receives one hand from a range of 2,598,960 possible hands. An
increase in the number of cards in the model will therefore be a good step towards a better
approximation of the skill involved in real life poker games.
This paper approximates the situation with 2,598,960 hands by studying an extension of
the two-player poker model with alternate bidding that was introduced by Von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944, chapter 19). This game is played as follows. First, both players pay an
ante and receive a hand. Next, player 1 chooses between betting a ¯xed bet size, and passing.
When player 1 has decided to bet, then player 2 can choose between folding and calling at the
cost of the bet size. In the ¯rst case, he gives up the ante, while in the second case the same
thing happens as when player 1 has passed: a showdown follows. In the showdown, the player
with the better hand wins the pot. A speci¯c variant of this game is also studied in the book of
Binmore (1992).
In the model of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) the hands of the players are drawn
from a continuous uniform distribution on [0;1]. This paper extends the model by considering
general hand distributions. We compute the value of the game as well as optimal strategies
for both players. Next, we translate our general strategic results to the situation where the
game is played with a deck of 52 cards. We need this information to perform our ¯nal step, the
approximation of the skill level of this game using the method described by Borm and Van der
Genugten (2001). More details and applications of this skill analysis can be found in the book
on skillful gambling by Van der Genugten, Das and Borm (2001).
The paper is organized as follows. First, we will give an exact description of the speci¯c
poker game under consideration in section 2. In section 3 we will compute the optimal strate-
gies for both players and discuss equilibrium play in some more detail. Subsequently, we will
approximate optimal play for the case where this poker game is played with a regular deck of
52 cards. This is the subject of section 4. Finally, we will measure the presence of skill in this
variant of poker and present the results in section 5.
2 Game description
We will give a formal description of the rules of our poker game, to which we will refer as
minipoker throughout this text. To begin the game, both players add an ante of size a to the







that can be dealt in a general poker game, the hands are assumed to be real numbers, drawn
from the interval [0;1]. Player 1's hand is the value u of a continuous random variable U and
player 2's hand is the value v of a continuous random variable V . U and V are independently,
identically distributed on [0;1] according to the cumulative distribution function F : [0;1] ! R+.
The function f : [0;1] ! R++ denotes the probability density function for this distribution and
2is assumed to be positive and continuous on its domain.
After seeing his hand, player 1 can choose between passing and betting. If he passes, a
showdown follows immediately. In the showdown, the players compare their hands and the
player with the highest hand wins the pot. Betting means adding an extra amount b to the
stakes. After a bet by player 1, player 2 can decide to fold or to call. If he folds, then he loses
his ante of a to player 1. To call, player 2 must put an extra amount b in the pot. In that case,
a showdown follows and the player with the better hand takes the pot.
The di®erence with the case of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) is that they only
consider hands u and v that are drawn independently from uniform distributions on [0;1].
Furthermore, they use a somewhat di®erent terminology for the strategic options of the players.
Whereas we distinguish the terms betting en passing for player 1 and calling and folding for
player 2, Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) speak of bidding high and bidding low for both
players.
Figure 1 displays our poker model in extensive form. Two possible hands, u1 and u2, for
player 1 are shown. To keep the picture clear, player 2 is shown receiving his hand v after player
1 has decided how to bet. Notice that the hand v shown in the picture has a value that satis¯es
u1 < v < u2.
Figure 1: The extensive form of two-person minipoker (u1 < v < u2).
3 Optimal strategies
In this section we will search for the Nash equilibria of minipoker. We restrict attention to
behavioural strategies that are measurable functions of the player's hands. The structure of the
3analysis is similar to the way Binmore (1992, chapter 12) explains a speci¯c variant of this game.
Pure strategies for Von Neumann's poker model are functions g : [0;1] ! fP;Rg and h :
[0;1] ! fF;Cg. A mixed strategy is therefore something rather complex. Since the game has
the property of perfect recall, according to Kuhn (1953) we can work with behavioural strategies
as well, without really restricting the players in their possibilities.
A behavioural strategy for player 1 is a function p : [0;1] ! [0;1], where p(u) is the prob-
ability with which he bets if the value of his hand is u. Similarly, a behavioural strategy for
player 2 is a function q : [0;1] ! [0;1], where q(v) is the probability with which he plans to call
if he is dealt a hand with value v.
Suppose that the players use the behavioural strategies p and q. Then, given a deal (u;v),
we can compute the expected gain z(u;v) of player 1. This value depends on who has the better








P z }| {
a(1 ¡ p(u))
= a + bp(u)q(v):








P z }| {
a(1 ¡ p(u))
= 2ap(u) ¡ (2a + b)p(u)q(v) ¡ a:
Even though player 1 does not know what player 2 is holding, he can now compute the expec-











(a + bp(u)q(v))f(v)dv +
Z 1
u
(2ap(u) ¡ (2a + b)p(u)q(v) ¡ a)f(v)dv
We can write
E1(u) = p(u)S1(u) + T1(u);
where
S1(u) = 2a(1 ¡ F(u)) + b
Z u
0




T1(u) = 2aF(u) ¡ a:















4Thus we can write
E2(v) = q(v)S2(v) + T2(v);
where











When we look for a Nash equilibrium (e p; e q), all that matters are the signs of the functions e S1
and e S2, obtained by writing q(v) = e q(v) and p(u) = e p(u). How can we see this? Suppose that
player 2 uses strategy e q. Then player 1 will get a payo® of p(u)e S1(u) + e T1(u) if he raises with
probability p(u) when dealt u. If e S1(u) > 0, the choice p(u) = 1 is optimal. If e S1(u) < 0, the
choice p(u) = 0 is optimal. Only if e S1(u) = 0, other choices of p(u) are optimal too. Applying
similar considerations to player 2, we obtain the following criteria for equilibrium strategies e p
and e q:
e S1(u) > 0 ) e p(u) = 1;
e S1(u) < 0 ) e p(u) = 0;
0 < e p(u) < 1 ) e S1(u) = 0;
e S2(v) > 0 ) e q(v) = 1;
e S2(v) < 0 ) e q(v) = 0;
0 < e q(v) < 1 ) e S2(v) = 0:
Figure 2(a) shows what the graph of e S2(v) looks like. Here and in other ¯gures, for F we have
chosen the uniform distribution on the interval [0;1], while the ratio b
a of the bet size and the
ante is equal to 1. To check this, take a look at the expression for e S2(v). Since both a and b
are positive numbers, f(u) is assumed to be positive for all u 2 [0;1] and p(u) can only take
nonnegative values, it follows that the function e S2 is weakly increasing in v. Substituting v = 0
in the formula for e S2(v) yields e S2(0) · 0, while substitution of v = 1 tells us e S2(1) ¸ 0. Since e S2
is necessarily continuous, there exist numbers x and y such that x is the smallest number in [0;1]
for which e S2(x) = 0 and y is the largest number in [0;1] for which e S2(y) = 0. Note that, unless
x = y, the function e S2 cannot be strictly increasing. The information about e S2, summarized
in ¯gure 2(a), tells us much about the function e q. What we know about e q is summarized in
¯gure 2(c).
The expression for e S2(v) is informative about the function e p too. Since e S2(v) is constant for
v on the interval [x;y], we must have e p(v) = 0 on the interval (x;y). However, e p(v) cannot be
zero on a larger open interval I, because this would imply that e S2(v) would then be constant
on I. This constant would need to be zero, because e S2(v) = 0 on the interval [x;y]. However,
this contradicts the fact that [x;y] is the largest interval on which e S2(v) = 0.
5Figure 2: Finding the equilibrium strategies e p and e q.
What we have learned about e p tells us something about e S1. It cannot be that e S1(u) < 0
immediately to the left of x, because then e p(u) = 0 immediately to the left of x. Because e S1 is
continuous, it follows that e S1(x) ¸ 0. For similar reasons e S1(y) ¸ 0. Figure 2(c) tells us that
e q(u) = 0 for every u on the interval (0;x) and that e q(u) = 1 on the interval (y;1). Within these
intervals, we can di®erentiate e S1(u) with respect to u, to obtain that
d
du
e S1(u) = ¡2af(u) + 2(a + b)e q(u)f(u) for all u 2 (0;x) [ (y;1):
Thus d
du e S1(u) < 0 for u 2 (0;x) and d
du e S1(u) > 0 for u 2 (y;1). Consequently, e S1 decreases on
[0;x] and increases on [y;1], as indicated in ¯gure 2(b).
Figure 2(b) enables us to tie down e p completely. We already know that e p(u) = 0 for
u 2 (x;y). But now we know that e S1(u) > 0 on [0;x) and (y;1]. Thus, e p(u) = 1 on these
intervals, as ¯gure 2(d) shows.
6Next, use the information about e p and e q, together with the fact that e S1(x) = e S1(y) =
e S2(x) = e S2(y) = 0 to see that x and y are determined by the equations
F(y) = 1 ¡
2a + b
b











(a + b)(4a + b)
¶
and y = F¡1
µ
(2a + b)2 ¡ 2a2
(a + b)(4a + b)
¶
: (1)
So e p is determined uniquely. However, e q is not. For x · v < y, e q(v) can be chosen freely, subject
to the constraints
1 ¡ F(y) =
Z y
x
q(v)f(v)dv and e S1(u) · 0 for x < u < y:
















for x < u < y:
Verbally, e q is constrained such that between x and y the average of e q(v) is a
a+b, and on any right
end of this interval the average of e q(v) is at least a
a+b. Although there are many choices for e q
that satisfy these constraints, there is a unique admissible Nash equilibrium strategy that does
this. A strategy is said to be admissible for a player if no other strategy for that player does
better against one strategy of the opponent without doing worse against some other strategy of
the opponent. This is the strategy with which player 2 folds when his hand is under a certain











(a + b)(4a + b)
¶
: (2)
This admissible strategy is already indicated in Figure 2(c). Using the strategies e p and e q we
computed, we can derive the value of the minipoker game. In Figure 3 all possible hands for
player 1 are set out horizontally, together with the action chosen for each hand u. For player 2,
the hands v and corresponding actions are set out vertically. In each of the ten areas that
appear, we know the combination of actions chosen by both players and thus we can give the
payo® for each possible combination of hands. By multiplying the area size with this payo®,
7Figure 3: Expected payo® for all (u;v) to player 1 in the Nash equilibrium (e p; e q).



















































where x and y are as de¯ned in equation (1). The results of the analysis above are summarized
in Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.1 If minipoker is played with ante a and bet size b and the hands u and v of the






















. In this case, optimal strategies are
Prfbet with hand ug = e p(u) =
(
1 if PrfV · ug · ab




for player 1 and
Prfcall with hand vg = e q(v) =
(





8The results for the case of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) where F is the uniform
distribution on [0;1], follow directly from Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.2 The minipoker game of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), in which F was
the uniform distribution, has value
va;b =
a2b
(a + b)(4a + b)
= ax:
Optimal strategies are given by
Prfbet with hand ug = e p(u)
(
1 if u · ab




for player 1 and
Prfcall with hand vg = e q(v) =
(





So, in this simple case, the value of the game is equal to the product of the ante and the value of
the hand that indicates player 1's strategic boundary between blu±ng and passing. Interesting
is the fact that the value is positive in this case. The game is favourable for player 1. To see for
what combination of values of the ante and the bet size the game is most favourable for player 1,




a2(2a ¡ b)(2a + b)
(a + b)2(4a + b)2 :
This derivative is zero at b = 2a. This is the only solution, since both a and b are positive. Since
d2
db2va;b = ¡ 1
81a < 0 for these relative values of the bet size and the ante, we know that the ratio
b
a = 2 is optimal for player 1. This special case is called pot-limit minipoker, since the maximal
bet size (in this case the only possible bet size) equals the total size of the pot. Now we can
formulate Proposition 3.3.
Proposition 3.3 The pot-limit variant of minipoker with uniform hand distributions is the
unfairest variant possible.
Another thing that is intuitively clear, is easy to recognize now too: for minipoker with uniform
distributions the strategies of the players depend only on the ratio b
a of the bet size and the ante
and not on the absolute values of b and a. If we de¯ne the ratio r as r = b
a and substitute this
information in the expressions for the boundary values x, y and z given in equations (1) and
(2), we ¯nd that
x =
r
(r + 4)(r + 1)
; y =
r2 + 4r + 2
(r + 4)(r + 1)
and z =
r2 + 3r
(r + 4)(r + 1)
:
9This fact is displayed in Figure 4, in which we can also see the limits
lim
r!1x = 0; lim
r!1y = lim










The shapes of these curves for larger values of r is intuitively clear: when betting and calling






















































Figure 4: Boundary values for the optimal strategies as a function of the ratio b
a of the bet size
and the ante.
becomes relatively expensive, it is wise to do it not too often. As the ratio goes to zero, the
number of hands with which player 2 calls increases quickly. Giving up the ante by folding
becomes relatively expensive. As a consequence, player 1 only folds with the higher half of the
hands, for which the probability that he has the highest hand is larger than 1
2. Finally, at r = 2,
the case of pot-limit poker, we see that player 1 has the largest blu±ng area.
4 A regular deck of cards
In the previous section we derived optimal strategies in the two-person poker game for both
players in a general form. These strategies were given in terms of quantiles of the continuous
distribution function F, the distribution function from which the hands of the players were
drawn. In this section we will see what these results imply when the game is played with a
regular deck of cards, from which the players draw real poker hands.
104.1 Classi¯cation of poker hands
Before we start translating strategies, let us ¯rst give an overview of the poker hands that can
occur. A poker hand is a combination of ¯ve cards, drawn from a deck of 52 cards. The deck
consists of four suits: hearts (~), clubs (|), diamonds (}) and spades (Ä). All suits are equally
valuable, while the 13 cards of each suit have, ranked in decreasing order, the values A(ce),
K(ing), Q(ueen), J(ack), 10, 9, ..., 2. All hands belong to one of the ten classes that are
de¯ned in decreasing order of value in Table 1. The order of hands within a class is determined
Class Description Example
RF Royal Flush ¯ve consecutive cards of one suit, starting
with an ace
(|A;|K;|Q;|J;|10)
SF Straight Flush ¯ve consecutive cards of the same suit (an
ace can have the value 1)
(Ä5;Ä4;Ä3;Ä2;ÄA)
4K Four of a Kind four cards with equal values (}4;|4;~4;Ä4;}Q)
FH Full House a triplet of cards with the same values,
together with a pair with equal values
(Ä5;|5;}5;}10;~10)
F Flush ¯ve cards of the same suit (|K;|J;|9;|3;|2)
S Straight ¯ve consecutive cards (~K;ÄQ;~J;|10;}9)
3K Three of a Kind three cards with the same value (|Q;~Q;ÄQ;}J;~6)
2P Two pair two pairs with the same values within each
pair
(ÄA;~A;}8;Ä8;|3)
1P One pair one pair of cards with equal values (~9;}9;|K;}10;}4)
HC High Card any combination of cards that does not ¯t
in any of the classes above
(~K;}J;}9;|4;Ä2)
Table 1: Classi¯cation of poker hands
by comparing the cards of the hands separately, starting with the most important card of a hand.
The importance of the card within a hand depends on the class to which the hand belongs. In
Table 1 the card order in the example hands is such that the most important cards are put in
front.





= 2;598;960. The number of hands in each class and the probability of receiving
a hand from this class is given in Table 2 for all ten classes. The decreasing probabilities are
the reason that the order of the classes is as it is. If we pay attention to the order of the hands
within the ten classes, then we obtain 7;462 ordered subclasses. Within each subclass, all hands
really are equal. In Figure 5 we give the frequencies with which hands of a certain subclass
appear. The small bar with high frequencies around subclass number 7;200 corresponds to the
Straights, while the somewhat wider block with frequencies of 24 corresponds to Full House.













Table 2: Numbers and probabilities for all classes of poker hands






















lowest hand in "High Card" "Royal Flush"
Figure 5: Frequencies of appearance of subclasses of poker hands in a single deck of 52 cards.
where both hand numbers and frequencies are normalized.
4.2 From a continuous to a discrete distribution
All results we presented so far were derived using continuous hand distributions. Now we want to
take these results from the continuous situation into the discrete real world, where the hands are
drawn from a deck of 52 cards, with or without replacement. An intuitive way to approximate
optimal strategies in the discrete game is the following. If the 5-card hand of a player ranks
n (from the bottom) out of 2,598,960, we treat his hand as if he were dealt n
2;598;960 in the

















































Figure 6: Continuous approximation of the cumulative distribution of the 7;462 subclasses of
poker hands in a single deck of 52 cards.
continuous game.
As Cutler (1975) suggests, there are at least three objections to this approximation. First
of all, the optimal strategies for the discrete case may di®er considerably from the ones derived
for the continuous case. However, according to Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, p. 209),
the maximal loss that can be incurred by playing the \continuous" strategy is not large. More
precisely, the di®erence is only of the order 1
2;598;960. Second, some di®erent hands have an equal
value, as the ordering (partly) disregards suits. This fact is taken care of by using the general
distribution F in our derivation. Even if certain hands occur with higher probability than others,
our results still apply. Finally, the hands are dealt from one deck without replacement. That
is, the hand one player holds a®ects what the other may hold. As a result, increasing the rank
of a hand does not necessarily increase its value. Consider the following example. If you hold a
straight °ush to the ¯ve, your opponent may hold 31 higher straight °ushes or three equal ones.
However, if you hold four aces and a six, your opponent may only beat you with 27 di®erent
straight °ushes. We will not take into account this last remark and focus on the case where
minipoker is played with a separate deck of cards for each player. Or equivalently, it could be
interpreted as the game in which the players' hands are drawn from a regular deck of 52 cards
with replacement. We will give an approximation for optimal play for this game in section 4.3.
134.3 Optimal play
In this section we will tell what the optimal minipoker strategies for both players mean in terms
of real poker hands. We consider the case where hands are drawn from a regular deck of cards
with replacement. Unless stated otherwise explicitly, the results in this section apply to the case
where the ante and the bet size are equal, i.e. r = b
a = 1. Recall from Theorem 3.1 that if
the players are dealt the hands u and v, the optimal strategy for player 1, stated in terms of
probabilities, for this ratio is
Prfbet with hand ug = e p(u) =
(
1 if PrfV · ug · 1
10 or PrfV · ug > 7
10;
0 otherwise;
and that it is optimal for player 2 to play
Prfcall with hand vg = e q(v) =
(
0 if PrfU · vg · 2
5;
1 otherwise:
Using the information that is displayed in Figure 6, we can translate these probabilities to the
probabilities of poker hands. We ¯nd that the nearly optimal strategy for player 1 is




1 if u · (Q;7;5;4;3);
0 if (Q;7;6;3;2) · u · (8;8;9;5;4);
1 if u ¸ (8;8;9;6;2);
and that it is approximately optimal for player 2 to play
Prfcall with hand vg =
(
0 if v · (A;Q;8;6;2);
1 if v ¸ (A;Q;8;6;3):
To be precise, for player 1 the hands are selected such that (Q;7;5;4;3) is the highest hand for
which PrfV · ug · 1
10 and (Q;7;6;3;2) is the lowest hand for which PrfV · ug > 1
10. To
indicate the dependency of the strategies on the ratio of bet size and ante, that was shown for
the uniform case in Figure 4, Table 3 gives the boundary hands for some other relative values of
a and b. In this table, x¡ is the highest hand below the boundary x. The de¯nitions for y¡ and
z¡ are analogous. The case r = 1 is included to compare with the results above. In Table 3 we
can clearly see that, with a relatively high cost of betting and calling, optimal play prescribes
betting and calling only for a small number of hands.
5 Relative skill
In this section we will study the game in which the hands u and v for player 1 and 2 are drawn
independently from a uniform distribution on [0;1]. We focus on the case with equal ante and
bet size again and normalize to a = b = 1. We will follow the analysis of skill analysis that
was proposed by Borm and Van der Genugten (2001). We will give a short description of this
relative skill measure for two-player games in the next section.
14x¡ y¡ z¡
r = b
a (player 1's upper (player 1's lower (player 2's lower
bound for blu±ng) bound for betting) bound for calling)
1 (Q;7;5;4;3) (8;8;9;5;4) (A;Q;8;6;2)
2 (Q;9;5;4;2) (10;10;Q;J;2) (3;3;K;J;2)
3 (Q;8;7;4;3) (J;J;A;9;3) (6;6;J;10;3)
5 (J;10;9;6;5) (K;K;10;9;3) (9;9;J;10;6)
10 (J;9;6;5;4) (A;A;K;J;10) (Q;Q;K;4;2)
100 (9;7;5;3;2) (K;K;K;Q;2) (7;7;7;K;4)
Table 3: Boundary values of the optimal strategies for both players for various ratios r = b
a.
5.1 The relative skill measure
For any game we distinguish three types of players: beginners, optimal players and ¯ctive
players. Beginners have just learned the rules of the game and play a naive strategy, while
the optimal players play a minimax strategy against their opponent. The ¯ctive players play
optimal too, but they have more information; they know the complete outcome of the external
chance moves before they have to decide what action to take. In minipoker this means that
a player knows what hand the opponent holds. In a two-person game these three types can
participate in the game in both player roles. Skill is de¯ned as the relative in°uence of the
players on the outcome of the game. To measure this, one computes two e®ects in the game, the
learning e®ect (LE) and the random e®ect (RE). The learning e®ect is de¯ned as the di®erence
in expected payo® between an optimal player and a beginner, while the random e®ect is the
di®erence between the expected payo® of a ¯ctive player and the expected payo® of an optimal
player. To compute expected payo®s in the strategic environment of the poker game, we also
need to know the strategy of the opponent. All three player types are evaluated against the same
type of opponent, namely one that plays the minimax strategy. To ¯nd the expected payo®s
of a speci¯c player type in a two-person game, we take the average over the two player roles.
When we refer to strategies we will use the subscript 0 to indicate that it is a strategy that is
used by a beginner, while a strategy with the subscript f corresponds to a ¯ctive player. If we
introduce the notation Ui(s1;s2) for the expected payo® to player i when player 1 plays strategy
s1 and player 2 uses strategy s2, then we can write down the expressions for the learning e®ect,













¡U1(p0; e q) ¡ U2(e p;q0)
U1(pf; e q) + U2(e p;qf) ¡ U1(p0; e q) ¡ U2(e p;q0)
(6)
15In this expression, p's correspond to strategies of player 1 and q's denote strategies of player 2.
It is easy to see from equations (4)-(6) that 0 · RS · 1. The limit cases RS = 0 and RS = 1
correspond to pure games of chance and pure games of skill respectively.
In section 5.2 we will present our assumptions on the behaviour of beginners in minipoker
as well as the resulting payo®s for these players, while section 5.3 contains the derivation of the
strategies that ¯ctive players use and the computation of their corresponding payo®s.
5.2 Beginners
What will be the strategies of players who play this game for the ¯rst time, just after the rules
are explained to them? Perhaps they heard about the famous video poker variant \Jacks or
Better". In this game, as the name suggests, only hands with a pair of Jacks, Queens, Kings
or Aces (and all hands from higher classes) have value for the player. As a result naive players
may be betting or calling with exactly these hands. Even if they do not know this game, this
border seems to be a reasonable one. After all, poker players tend to like hands that look fancy;
any hand with at least a pair of images surely satis¯es this condition of prettiness.
What does this reasoning mean for the strategies of the beginners? Player 1 bets only if his
hand is at least (J;J;4;3;2). For each player the total probability of receiving a hand up to
(J;J;4;3;2) is 1189
1498 ¼ 0:7937. So we can formulate the strategy for player 1 as a beginner as
p0(u) =
(
0 if 0 · u · 0:7937
1 if 0:7937 · u · 1;
while the beginner's strategy for player 2 can be formulated as
q0(v) =
(
0 if 0 · v · 0:7937
1 if 0:7937 · v · 1:
Both strategies are displayed graphically in Figure 7. In Figure 8 the expected payo® to player 1
Figure 7: The strategies p0 and q0 for beginning player 1 and player 2 respectively.
is given for all hand distributions (u;v), assuming that player 1 uses strategy p0 and player two
16Figure 8: Expected payo® for all (u;v) to player 1 if he plays as a beginner against the equilibrium
strategy e q of player 2.
plays the strategy e q, that is given in Corollary 3.2. Using this ¯gure, one can sum over a number
of simple integrals to ¯nd that the expected payo® to player 1 as a beginner is




We do the same computation for player 2, using Figure 9 in which the expected payo®s to
player 1 for the strategy combination (e p;q0) are shown and ¯nd that




Figure 9: Expected payo® for all (u;v) to player 1 if player 2 plays as a beginner against
equilibrium strategy e p of player 1 that was given in Corollary 3.2.
175.3 Fictive players
In the current section we will compute the expected payo®s of ¯ctive players in minipoker.
Fictive players have more information than normal players. They know the outcome of the
chance move in the game and they can use this information in their strategies. For minipoker,
this means that the ¯ctive player can base his actions on his own hand, but also on the hand of
his opponent. Given the fact that he plays against a player who uses the minimax strategy, he
can decide what will be his best action for any hand combination (u;v).
Figure 10 shows the payo® to player 1 for each hand combination if player 1 plays as a ¯ctive
player against player 2's equilibrium strategy e q. The payo®s in the ¯gure are such that player
1 takes the optimal action for each pair of hands (u;v). For example, in the area above the line
v = 2
5 and above the line u = v, player 1 knows that player 2 will always call. Since player
1 has the lower card, he had better pass. This leads to the expected payo® of ¡1 that the
¯gure displays for this area. The expected gains of player 1 can now be computed with help of
Figure 10 and are equal to




Figure 11 shows the payo® to player 1 for each card combination if player 2 plays as a ¯ctive
Figure 10: Expected payo® for all (u;v) to ¯ctive player 1 if player 2 uses the equilibrium
strategy e q.
player against player 1's equilibrium strategy e p. The expected gains for player 2 as a ¯ctive





18Figure 11: Expected payo® for all (u;v) to player 1, using his equilibrium strategy e p, if he faces
a ¯ctive player 2.
Player 1 Player 2 Game
Beginner 0.0812 -0.1176 -0.0182
Optimal 0.1000 -0.1000 0.0000
Fictive 0.3400 0.1400 0.2400
LE 0.0188 0.0176 0.0182
RE 0.2400 0.2400 0.2400
RS 0.0726 0.0682 0.0704
Table 4: Results of the skill analysis.
5.4 Results of the skill analysis
In the previous two sections we computed the expected payo®s of the beginners and the ¯ctive
players. For our two-person game we have enough information to compute the learning e®ect,
the random e®ect and the skill level according the formulas (4)-(6). The resulting numbers
are given in Table 4. In this table we also give the results of the skill analysis for each player
separately. The table illustrates that the game does not contain many skill elements for either of
the players. The relatively large random e®ects given in Table 4 tell us that the dealing has an
in°uence on the possibilities of both players that certainly is not negligible. This is an intuitive
result for this poker game with a very small range of strategic options for the players. Most
poker games have a more complex decision tree, which can for example include a number of
raises, multiple bet sizes and a draw. We expect that such an increase in the complexity of the
decision tree will also heighten the skill level of the game.
Although this skill level 0:0704 is close to zero, it is still relatively large, if compared to
the skill levels that Van der Genugten, Das and Borm (2001) found for games that intuitively
classify as games of chance, such as Golden Ten (0:012) and Roulette (0:0004). There is some
skill involved in poker, even in this simple variant, as our intuition already suggested.
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